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ABSTRACT
This paper compares the intra-day patterns on the NYSE and AMEX of volatility, trading
volume and bid-ask spreads for European dually-listed stocks, Japanese dually-listed stocksalso
listed in London. and Japanese dually-listed stocks not listed in London with American stocks
of comparable avenge wading volume and volatility. It is shown that the inira-day patternsfor
these stocks axe remarkably similar even though the public information flows differ markedly
across these stocks during the wading day. In the morning. Japanese stockshave the greatest
volatility and volume, followed by European stocks and American stocks.These rankings are
reversed in the afternoon. We argue that these patterns are consistent with markets reacting to
the overnight accumulation of public infonnation which is greatest for Japanese stockand
smallest for American stocks and inconsistent with the view that early morning volatility canbe
attributed to monopolistic specialist behavior.
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Considerable effort has been devoted recently to teaming about the determinants of stock
return volatility. This research has identified trading noise, public information, private information
and trading mechanisms as potentially important determinants of the volatility of stock returns.
To identify the relative importance of these determinants, contributions to the literature have
focused mostly on experiments that exploit differences in trading mechanisms, in the arrival of
public information, and in whether markets are open. For instance, French and Roll (1966) use
the suspension or trading on some Wednesdays in 1968 to compare non-trading days to trading
days with similar rates of arrival of public information. Barclay, Utzenberger and Warner (1990)
use Saturdays on the Tokyo stock exchange and U.S. returns of Japanese dually-listed stocks
to investigate the impact of trading on volatility when public Information arrival Is reduced. Stolt
and Whaley (1990) make the case that the opening mechanism of the NYSE increases stock
return volatility, whereas Amihud and Mendelson (1991) use the fact that the Tokyo stock
exchange has two trading periods to argue that higher opening volatility is mostly the result of the
incorporation of overnight Information. Foster and George (1992) use trading and non-trading
period returns of dually-listed stocks and control stocks that trade only In the U.S. to argue that
the greater volatility at the open is due to the accumulation of orders at the open. Papers in this
literature focus on trading and nontrading period returns because there are no differences among.
stocks in the arrival of public information during the trading period for the experiments they
conduct.
In this paper, we Investigate the determinants of stock return volatility in a setting where
the rate of arrival of public information differs predictably acmss stocks during the trading day.
We compare the intraday return behavior during the U.S. trading day or European, Japanese, and
IAmerican stocks listed on the NYSE or the AMEX.' For European stocks, the arrival of public
information drops off at the end of the morning in the U.S. as the European business day comes
to an end. In contrast, for Japanese stocks, the anival of public information is uniformly low during
the U.S. trading day because the business day in Japan does not overlap with the trading day
ii the U.S. Hence, using these three classes of stocks, we compare stocks with very different
patterns of public.inforrnation arrival. Since the rate of public information arrival changes during
the day across our sample, the sample is also well-suited to study the relation between the arrival
of public information, volatility, trading volume, and bid-ask spreads. In particular, the sample is
useful to address the issue of whether the arrival of public information leads to more trading,
either because the arrivals of public and private information are correlated or because, as in the
models of Varian (1989) and Harris and Raviv (1993). investors trade on public information
because it changes their priors differentially.
If public information is an important determinant of volatility, one would expect European
stocks to experience a drop in volatility relative to American stocks when the European business
day ends. We rind that indeed more of the daily volatility of European stocks accrues during the
morning than for American stocks with similar daily volume and volatility, but the difference is not
statistically significant. The rate of accrual of volatility does not significantly differ between
American stocks and European stocks in any of the four 65-minute trading periods from 10:35
to 14:55; further, the cumulative difference in the rate of accrual of volatility between European
stocks and the American matching stocks never exceeds 2% of daily volatility. When we turn to
'In an interesting recent paper, Kleldon and Werner (1993) examine the intraday patterns of
cross-listed U.K stocks from the open in London to their close in the U.S. to understand better
the implications of 24-hour trading of stocks. In their paper, they do not provide the comparisons
across classes of stocks with different arrival rates of public information which are the focus of
this paper. In this paper, we treat European stocks as a group and Japanese stocks as a group.
Consequently, we do not investigate separately London-listed stocks. The results we report for
the European sample are not inconsistent with those of Kleidon and Werner (1993), though.
2Japanese stocks, these stocks also display higher volatility inthe morning despite the fact that
there is no reason to suspect that they would have more public information in the morning than
their matching American stocks. After the first hour of trading, 40% of the daily volatility of
Japanese stocks has accnied in contrast to 29% of the daily volatilityof European stocks.
American matching stocks, however. accrue significantly more volatility than Japanese stocks in
every trading period from 10:35 to 14:55.
Our results raise two puzzles: (1) why do foreign stocks behave so much like comparable
American stocks during the trading day and (2) why is the high volatility in the early morning
trading in New York pervasive across stocks? Since the European and some Japanesestocks
trade in Europe. there are observed foreign prices for most of the foreign stocks in our sample
when New York opens and there is also a competing market for these stocks. The explanations
for the higher volatility In the morning, such as price discovery or the role of the specialist imply
that the abnormal early moming volatility should be smaller for foreign stocks, which we do not
observe. Explanations which rely on private information trading also seem to be inappropriate
here since one would expect private information to be more important in New York for domestic
stocks.
We argue that trading on accumulated overnight public information helps explain the
puzzle that volatility and volume are high on foreign stocks early in the moming.If overnight
public information Is incorporated In pilces at the opening, one would expect less volatilityand
less volume on Japanese stocks than on their matching stocks early in the morning since the
arrival rate of public information for these stocks is low relative to American stocks. In contrast,
if there Is uncertainty as to how American Investors will react to the accumulated ovemight public
information, the opposite is possible If the accumulated public Information for Japanese stocks
is more important than the accumulated public information accrued on American stocks and the
3public information accruing on these stocks early in the morning. Ta understand this, suppose that
stock trading Is segmented in the sense that investors trade a stock in their home country if they
can.' This means that American investors trade foreign stocks In New York if they are listed there.
When New York opens, American investors therefore adjust their portfolios based on how the
information that accrued ovemight affects their priors. Since markets have been open in the
foreign countries after the previous close of New York trading, substantially more public
information has accrued about foreign stocks than about domestic stocks. Hence, one would
expect both more volatility and more trading for foreign stocks in the morning in reaction to the
overnight accumulation of public information. Since public information about American firms
accrues at a higher rate during the day, one would expect more volatility and trading for these
stocks later in the day. However, if American news is Informative about foreign stocks, the
differences in volatility and volume patterns between foreign and domestic stocks during the rest
of the day are likely to be smaller than one would expect if American news conveys no
information about foreign stocks, which helps explain why intraday day patterns are similar for
domestic and foreign stocks.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we present our data and returns evidence.
In section 3, we show the volatility patterns. In sections 4 and 5, we discuss respectively the
evidence on volume and bid-ask spreads. We condude in section 6.
SectIon 2. Data and evidence on returns.
The dataset we use is constructed as follows. Using the 1986 and 1987 ISSM tapes, we
2 Kleidon and Werner(1993) provide evidence that the London and New York markets are
segmented, in the sense that they have separate, distinct intra-day patterns such that the New
York intra-day pattern is not the continuation of the London intra-day pattern. Their concept of
segmentation does not imply segmented trading, but segmented trading implies distinct intra-day
patterns.
4select all listings under the names ADR, New York Shares and Common Stocks from countries
in the European time zone and from Japan. To be kept in the dataset, firms must have at least
6 trades a day on average, have 100 trading days in the year, and the lowest price in the year
must be more than $3. For each foreign firm, we select three matching domestic stocks which
have similar trading activity in terms of the average daily number of trades, have similar standard
deviations of hourly returns, and trade on the same exchange as the dual listed share? We drop
all observations from October 14, 1987 to October 30, 1987. The Appendix lists our sample of
foreign stocks and the matching stocks. We have 14 European stocks in 1986 and 21 in 1987.
Them are 5 Japanese stocks in the sample for 1986 and for 1987; of the Japanese stocks, 2 are
listed in London in 1986 and in 1987.
To Investigate intraday patterns, we treat the opening trade separately from the rest of the
day that is divided In six equally spaced intervals of 65 minutes from 9:30 a.m. to 4.00 p.m. For
the opening return, we use the return from the previous overnight dose to the first trade or to the
mid-point of the first bid-ask quote, whichever is first observed. The return for each interval is
computed from the mid-point of the last bid-ask quote before the end of the previous interval to
the mid-point of the last bid-ask quote of the Interval. If the bid-ask quote does not change during
the interval, the return for the interval is set equal to zero. If the absolute value of the return is
greater than 50% during the interval, it is Ignored.
For the variance estimates, we first compute the average return, r for each interval i and
each firm j by taking the average of the returns r across T days. where T is the number of days
for which the returns are available. We then compute a squared return adjusted for the average
return, (r - r/, which we call V. We average V across firms of the same class in the sample
We also compared intra-day patterns by matching ADRs with domestic stocks of similar
volume only. Our condusions are generally the same in that case.
5to obtain VN for that class of firms. In this study, we use six different firm classes: European firms,
Japanese firms, Japanese firms also listed In London, Japanese firms notlisted in London,
matching firms of European firms, and matching firms of Japanese firms.
To test for differences In intraday patterns between two classes of firms, we pair them in
the following system of equations:
V11 - bb0 +
V-(1 -1b)bQ+eQi01...5 (1)
v -(1 - + b1D)b +
where i = 0 corresponds to the open, and the variables and coefficients with an asterisk are for
the second firm class. In this setting, the parameter bD is the total intraday variance excluding the
opening variance. The b coefficients, fori = 0,15, measure the opening and intraday variance
as a fraction of the total intraday variance, and the b coefficients measure the variance
differences between the first and the second firm class. This approach is inspired by the work of
Foster and Viswanathan (1993). They estimate intraday patterns separately for each firm and
then derive implications from the distribution of these patterns across firms. The small number
of dually-listed firms prevents us from focusing on the distribution of intraday patterns across
firms. Instead, we estimate the intraday patterns for each class of firms directly.
In estimating equations (1), we use Hansen's (1982) Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM) procedure. We impose the following orthogonality conditions:
6Ott
1 - 0 (2)
0•
To estimate b, the vector of 14 unknown b coefficients, we minimize the quadratic form g'Wg,
where W, a symmetric weighting matrix, is a consistent estimator of the inverse of the asymptotic
covariance matrix or T"2g(6), where 6 is the estimate of b, after adjusting for serial correlation
as suggested by Newey and West (1987). Note that in (2). each equation descilbes the variance
in an intraday period. Consequently, if there Is autocorrelation in the residuals, it arises from the
daily autocorrelation of the volatility for that lntraday period. The correlation in volatility between
intraday periods, or cross-correlation, is captured as cross-sectional covariance In the weighting
matrix W. Though the system is just identified and our 0MM estimates coincide with those of
ordinary least squares, our standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and
cross-correlation between Intra-day periods.
With 6 as the vector of estimates of b, and 8T as the consistent estimator of
8g4)
we have
- b) - N(o,IST'wsTr').
We test for the significance of the estimates using this covariance matrix.
Volume for an intraday interval refers to the normalized number of shares traded during
that interval. We first calculate the number of shares traded over each interval. We then compute
the firm average as the average across all intervals and all days. To obtain the normalized
7volume during an interval, we divide the number of shares traded over that interval by the firm
average, and take the average across firms. To test for significance, we estimate equations (1)
using the volume instead of the squared returns.
The bid-ask spread is measured as a percent of the bid-ask mid-point. It is observed at
the market open and at the end of eath trading interval. We then estimate equations (I) using
the bid-ask spreads, but the estimated coefficients are scaled so that they can be interpreted as
the bid-ask spread in an Interval as a fraction of the bid-ask spread during the third trading
literval (11:40-12:45).
Although our focus is not the intraday returns, we present evidence on these returns in
table 1 and figure 1 for the sake of completeness. Intra-day retums follow a U-shaped pattern for
all stocks similar to the one documented previously by Harris (1966). This reinforces one of the
two puzzles we document, namely the similarity in intra-day patterns between domestic and
foreign stocks trading in New York: all stock groups have a significant last interval return. The
overnight return is positive for all stock groups, but significant for foreign stocks only. The other
E'ttra-day retums are insignificant except for the return for European stocks in the first interval.
Looking at the difference in returns between firm types, we find that European stocks have
significantly lower returns in the first trading interval and significantly higher returns overnight and
Ei the fifth trading interval. Japanese stocks have a significantly higher return than their matthing
stocks ovemight and in the last interval and do not have asignificantly different return from their
matching stocks in any other interval. The Japanese stocks listed in London have a significantly
higher return in the third trading period than those which are not and have insignificantly different
returns in all the other periods.
8Section 3. Intra-day volatility patterns.
Intra-day volatility patterns have been studied (or U.S. stocks with the database we use.
First, Wood, Mcinish and Ord (1985) using minute by minute transactions data show a U-shaped
pattern for intra-day volatility. Harris (1986) also documents a strong U-shaped pattern for intra-
day volatility using 15-minutes returns. Finally. Foster and Viswanathan (1993) present results that
are comparable to our study. They investigate the Intra-day volatility for three groups of stocks.
They divide the sample of NYSE stocks on the ISSM database that meet some selection criteria
into deciles of trading activity and select 20 stocks in the first, fifth and tenth deciles of trading
ac*ity. They show that, for all their deciles, there is significant intraday variation in volatility, with
volatility being the highest during the first half-hour of trading. To make the first half-hour
comparable to the other periods, they double its return. They compare all trading intervals to the
first half-hour and find that all intervals have a significantly lower variance than the first Interval.
For the first and tenth deciles, the coefficient estimates of regressions similar to (1) show a
distinct U-shaped pattern, but no suth pattem is present for the fifth decile.
Table 2 presents our coefficient estimates of equations (1). Since the fractions of intraday
intervals sum to one, the coefficient for the last trading interval is just one minus the sum of the
5 previous intraday intervals and no individual t-test is possible for that interval. The results for
European stocks are given in panel A. The estimates give the normalized variance for an interval,
defined as a fraction of the total Intraday variance ignoring the close-to-open variance. It Is
immediately apparent that the variance fractions follow a U-shaped pattern during the day and
this is confirmed In figure 2A. The dose-to-open variance has the highest traction and the
fractions decline thereafter until the Interval from 12:45 to 13:50. After this period, the fractions
increase again. The same pattern holds for the domestic comparison stocks.
Table 2 makes it possible to compare per period the volatility patterns of the European
9i overnight normalized variances is of the same magnitude as thedifferences in overnight
normalized variances for European stocks and their matching American stocks,which is
significant. Hence, one can interpret this evidence as indicating thatinvestors are more willing to
trade at the open when a competing exchange is open. Two possible reasons forthis are: (a)
opening prices are less noisy or (b) trading is cheaper becauseor competition. Given that the rate
of volatility accn.ial for Japanese stocks not fisted in London is not higher followingthe open. it
is hard to argue that the data is supportive of (a). To investigate (b), we have tolook at bid-ask
spreads which we do next.
Section 5. BId-ask spread Intra-day patterns.
We now tum to a comparison of the bid-ask intra-day patterns. Existing evidence for
American stocks from Mclnish and Wood (1992), Hasbrouck (1991a,b) and Foster and
Viswanathan (1993) indicates that there is a U-shaped pattern in bid-ask spreads. Foster and
Viswanathan show that there are significant differences in adverse selection costs during the day,
but that these differences are hard to reconcile with models of concentrated trading which suggest
that the bid-ask spread should be tower when trading is highest. Their evidence is stronger for
the most actively traded firms, however.
In table 7, we provide our evidence on intra-day patterns in bid-ask spreads. In panel A,
we report the results for European stocks. The midday spread is lower for European stocks than
it is for their matching American stocks. However, at the open, the normalized spread for
European stocks, i.e., the spread divided by its midday value, is significantly higher than for
American stocks: 17.2% versus 11.7%. Hence, the existence of a competing market for the
European stocks does not imply a smatler spike in spread in the morning, which makes it hard
18intraday volatility during the first trading Interval even though, In contrast to the European and
American stocks, their home business and trading days are over. As a result of this greater
accrual of volatility In the first trading interval, Japanese stocks have significantly higher
normalized volatility than their comparison group during that interval. In contrast, the comparison
group has significantly higher normalized volatility over each of the subsequent four intervals and
identical normalized volatility during the last interval. Hence, there is more evidence of differences
in volatility patterns between Japanese and U.S. stocks than between European and U.S. stocks,
in the sense of more intervals with significant differences. This is evidenced by the fact that the
ratio of moming to afternoon normalized volatility of Japanese stocks is significantly higher than
the ratio of morning to afternoon normalized volatility of matching stocks. Finally, for the Japanese
stocks, the differences In normalized volatility are more economically significant: the fraction of
intraday volatility that accrues to Japanese stocks In the first period of trading is almost 50%
higher than the fraction that accrues to the comparison group of American stocks.
Table 3 provides a measure of how volatility accrues during the day which confirms the
results of table 2. The volatility accrual rate for European stocks is faster than for their matching
American stocks throughout the day until the last trading period, so that before the start of that
period significantly more volatility has accrued for European stocks than for their matching
American stocks. The volatility accrual rate for Japanese stocks is faster also, but it is also faster
relative to European stocks. In contrast to European stocks, Japanese stocks accrue significantly
more volatility than their matching American stocks early in the morning. At the end of the first
three trading periods, the Japanese stocks have accrued significantly more volatility than their
matching stocks. However, the difference in volatility accrual falls steadily during the day so that
by the end of the fourth trading period the fraction of daily volatility accrued for Japanese stocks
is indistinguishable from the fraction of daily volatility accrued for American stocks.
11There are several possible explanations for the evidence we uncover in tables 2 and 3.
First, following Amihud and Mendelson (1991), one could argue that opening prices are noisy
estimates of public information, so that the first hour Of trading incorporates public information into
prices that was already available at the opening. Since the Japanese business daydoses after
the end of the Japanese trading day, Japanese public information accrues after the dose of the
trading day in Japan. For stocks not listed in Europe, this information can only be incorporated
into prices when the NYSE opens. In contrast, for stocks listed in Europe, there is trading when
the NYSE opens, so stock prices provide more predse estimates of the existing public
information. The price discovery hypothesis suggests that morning volatility accrual should be
less for the stocks listed In London. Panel C in table 2 explores this hypothesis by dividing the
Japanese stocks into stocks listed in London and stocks not listed in London. In the first trading
period, there is no difference between the two groups, whereas in the second period, London-
listed stocks have higher normalized volatility than non-London listed stocks. This evidence does
not support the price discovery hypothesis. The second trading period corresponds to the London
dose; hence, the Japanese stocks listed in London have an increase in volatility around the
London dose, so that their intra-day volatility in the U.S. inherits both the U-shaped pattern of
London stocks and the U-shaped pattern of U.S. stocks. In contrast, but similarly to Kieidon and
Werner (1993), the European stocks do not exhibit an increase in volatility at the dose of the
European markets.
Since the New York specialist does not have a monopoly position at the opening for
European stocks and for Japanese stocks listed in London, the higher first period normalized
volatility can be attributed to specialist behavior only if one believes that American investors would
not switth to the foreign market to avoid specialist rent-seeking. Whereas such a view is plausible
given the higher transaction costs abroad, one would still expect to observe greater volatility for
12domestic stocks for the simple reason that there are fewer alternatives for investors wishing to
trade domestic stocks than for investors wishing to trade foreign stocks. Hence, it is hard to view
our evidence as supportive of the argument advanced by Stoll and Whaley (1990).
It could well be that the massive overnight arrival of public Information for foreign stocks
is accompanied by an equally massive anival of short-lived private information. If this were the
case, one would expect investors to trade on this private information early in the day. With this
view, though, one would expect the volatility Increase to be smaller for Japanese stocks traded
in London than for Japanese stocks not traded in London simply because some of the private
infôtination will be traded upon In London. As explained above, this is not the case.
The final explanation we consider is inspired by the trading models of Varian (1989) and
Harris and Raviv (1993). In these models, investors trade on public information because new
information leads them to change their pilots. Hence, American investors in Japanese or
European stocks trade on the overnight public information as the New York market opens if there
is segmented trading. Since we don't assume that these investors have valuable private
information which would be lost If they did not trade before New York opens, one would not
expect them to use the London market. Since London trading does not reflect how American
investors react to overnight public Information, the lack of a volatility difference in the first period
of trading between Japanese stocks listed in London and those that are not can be understood
with our explanation. If our explanation is correct, though, one would expect more trading early
in the moming for foreign stocks. We tum to a comparison of intra-day patterns in volume next.
All the above analysis Is done by computing retums using the mid-point between the bid
and ask quotes. We interpret this mid-point as the efficient market price, so that changes in that
mid-point correspond to the Incorporation of new information into prices. It could be, though, that
the mid-point moves around because of microstructural considerations. such as inventory
13concerns. This raises the question or whether these concernscould make our inferences from
the data Invalid. One approach would be to follow the time-series analysisof Hasbrouck (1 991a,b)
and allow explicitly for a transitory component in the mid-point of thebid-ask quote. Instead, we
show that our results about the similarity of the volatility patterns do not seemto depend on the
use of the mid-point of the bid-ask quote. Panel A of table4 shows results obtained using
transaction prices. The intraday variance of transaction prices is higherbecause of bid-ask
bounce. However, there seems to be no systematic mlcitstructural effectwhich explains our
results. The intraday patterns using transaction prices are mostly the same.In terms of the
comparison between foreign and American stocks, the most pronouncedeffect of using
transaction returns is for the first trading period for European stocks where the volatility difference
is now significant and for the second trading period for Japanese stocks where it is no longer
significant. As a result of these changes, the European stocks accnie significantly more volatility
in the morning than matching American stocks. The differences between transaction return
volatilities and bid-ask midpoint vplatilities are illustrated in panel B of table 4 and figure 3. There
is a significant difference for the overnight period, but no significant differences for the intraday
periods for the dually-listed stocks, except for the fourth trading period for the Japanese stocks
isted on the LSE. Considering transaction returns has the effect of strengthening somewhat the
result that European stocks have higher volatility than matching American stocks in the morning.
Section 4. Intra-day patterns In volume.
Jam and Joh (1988) report the hourly trading volume of the NYSE and demonstrate a U-
shaped pattern in trading volume during the day. Foster and Viswanathan (1993) examine the
intra-day volume pattern for top, bottom and middle deciles sorted by trading activity. They find
litra-day differences in volume for all categories, but the differences are most pronounced for the
14most actively traded stocks. For all categories, though, the intra-day pattern has a U-shape with
volume highest in the first half hour, falling until the fourth hour and then increasing again. The
highest volume coincides with the highest variance, wtiich Is supportiveof the model of
concentrated trading of Adrnati and Pfleiderer (1988). Foster and Viswanathan (1993) investigate
formally the relation between the regression coefficients of the volume regressions and of the
volatility regressions. For deciles one and ten they find a significant positive relationbetween the
coefficients of the two regressions.
In table 5 and figure 4, we present our results for the intra-day variation in volume. In
panel A, we show the results for the European stocks. It is immediately dear that thesestocks
exhibit a U-shaped intra-day pattern and this is shown in figure 4A. One way to evaluate this
pattern is by comparing a periods fraction of daily volume with the fraction of dailyvolume of the
period from 11:40 to 12:45. When we perform this comparison, we find significant differences for
all periods. European stocks have significantly more of their daily volume in the morning,
American stocks have significantly more in the afternoon, except in the last period. Relative to
the period from 11:40 to 12:45, European stocks have significantly sharper peaks than matching
American stocks. For instance, the first interval volume is 1.644 times the volume of the mid-day
period for European stocks and 1.215 for matching stocks. The difference has a t-statisticof
8.116. For the last period, the ratios are respectively 1.297 and 1.379, with a t-statistic for the
difference of 1.642. To Investigate further the concentration of trading, we compute Herfindahl
indices as the sum of the squared volume accrual rates. This ratio would take a value of one if
all trading is concentrated in one period and a value of 1F6 If trading takes place equally in each
period. The Herfindahl index is 0.180 for Eutopean stocks and 0.172 for American matching
stocks. Hence, both European and American stocks seem to have equally concentrated trading
when measured this way. We saw in table 2 that the normalized variance of European stocks
15exceeds the normalized variance of American comparison stocks by 1.9% of total intraday
variance during the first trading interval; In contrast, the difference in volume is 4.6%. Whereas
European stocks have significantly higher volume in the morning, they have significantly lower
volume In the afternoon except during the last trading period where there is no difference between
European and American stocks.
One might be tempted to attribute the differences in significance between tables 2 and 5
to differences in the power of the tests. It is true that differences between European and American
firms of similar magnitudes are significant for normalized volume but not for normalized volatility.
A closer look at the cumulative accnial of volume shows, however, that the volume and volatility
pattems are quite different. The estimate of the cumulative difference in normalized volatility from
10:35 to 14:55 Is zero whereas the estimate of the cumulative difference in normalized volume
is 4.0% over that period. For the last trading period, table 2 documents a significant difference
in normalized volatility, whereas it documents no significant differences in normalized volatility in
the four previous periods. In contrast, the normalized volume difference is not significant (or the
last period and is significantly different for all the other periods.
Panel B of table 5 provides results for the Japanese stocks. For these stocks, we again
observe a U-shaped pattem which is also apparent in figure 4B. This pattern is more pronounced
than for American stocks: a higher fraction of Japanese stock trading accrues in the first and last
trading intervals than for American stocks. For both the Japanese and matching American stocks.
the fraction of daily volume which accrues during the last interval is roughly comparable to the
fraction of daily volume which accrues during the first interval. The higher end-of-day volume of
the Japanese stocks is not accompanied by higher volatility. Except for the last interval, though.
Japanese stocks have greater volatility when they have greater volume. In contrast to the
comparison between European stocks and American stocks, the differences in volume are smaller
16than the differences in volatility: the fraction of volume that accrues to Japanese stocks in excess
of the fraction of volume that accrues to American stocks during the first interval is only 3.7% ol
the daily total in contrast to 9.9% for the variance. The small differences explain why the
Herfindahl ratio for trade concentration of Japanese stocks, 0.186, is so close to the one (or
matchiAg American stocks, 0.174. As for the comparison with European stocks, the Japanese
stocks have lower normalized volume each period from 10:35 to 14:55 and higher normalized
volume in the first and last interval.
Table 6 provides results on cumulative intraday volume. It shows that the normalized
volume of American stocks catches up with the normalized volume of Japanese stocks more
quickly during the day than it catches up with the normalized volume of European stocks. By
13:50, as much of the daily volume has accrued for American comparison stocks as for Japanese
stocks; for European stocks, this occurs by 14:55. This evidence is consistent with the view that
investors receive more information to trade upon late in the morning for European stocks than for
Japanese stocks.
The private information story would suggest more accumulation of volume early in the day
for Japanese stocks which do not trade on the London Stock Exchange. Panel C of tables 5 and
6 compares Japanese stocks listed in London with those that are not. There is some evidence
that (1) stocks listed in London trade more at the open and (2) volume accumulates faster after
the opening for stocks not listed in London. Interestingly, the greater normalized volume at the
open for London-listed stocks is approximately offset by the lesser normalized volume of these
stocks during the first two trading intervals. Hence, availability of the London market does lead
to a shift in trading towards the open. This shift is not accompanied by a similar significant shift
in variances: in table 2, the overnight normalized variance for stocks traded in London is
insignificantly higher and the first interval variance is insignificantly lower. Further, the difference
17i overnight normalized variances is of the same magnitude as thedifferences in overnight
normalized variances for European stocks and their matching American stocks,which is
significant. Hence, one can interpret this evidence as indicating thatinvestors are more willing to
trade at the open when a competing exchange is open. Two possible reasons forthis are: (a)
opening prices are less noisy or (b) trading is cheaper becauseor competition. Given that the rate
of volatility accn.ial for Japanese stocks not fisted in London is not higher followingthe open. it
is hard to argue that the data is supportive of (a). To investigate (b), we have tolook at bid-ask
spreads which we do next.
Section 5. BId-ask spread Intra-day patterns.
We now tum to a comparison of the bid-ask intra-day patterns. Existing evidence for
American stocks from Mclnish and Wood (1992), Hasbrouck (1991a,b) and Foster and
Viswanathan (1993) indicates that there is a U-shaped pattern in bid-ask spreads. Foster and
Viswanathan show that there are significant differences in adverse selection costs during the day,
but that these differences are hard to reconcile with models of concentrated trading which suggest
that the bid-ask spread should be tower when trading is highest. Their evidence is stronger for
the most actively traded firms, however.
In table 7, we provide our evidence on intra-day patterns in bid-ask spreads. In panel A,
we report the results for European stocks. The midday spread is lower for European stocks than
it is for their matching American stocks. However, at the open, the normalized spread for
European stocks, i.e., the spread divided by its midday value, is significantly higher than for
American stocks: 17.2% versus 11.7%. Hence, the existence of a competing market for the
European stocks does not imply a smatler spike in spread in the morning, which makes it hard
18to explain this spike by the monopolist behavior of NYSE specialists. Thenormalized spread for
European stocks falls continuously throughout the day, exceptfor being higher in the interval
from 13:50 to 14:55 than In the surrounding intervals. All afternoon spreads arelower than at mid-
day for European stocks and two are significantly lower. Thelast trading period spread is the
lowest of the day and is significantly lower than the spread of the American matchingstocks. As
shown on figure 5, European stocks do not exhibit a U-shaped pattern of bid-ask spreads even
though their volume and volatility do. The normalized bid-ask spreadof European stocks is
significantly higher than that of the matching stocks at the beginningof the day and significantly
lower at the end of the day. Nevertheless, the matching stocks do not exhibit much of a (i-shaped
pattern either the bid-ask spread of matching stocks at the endof the day is not significantly
higher than the bid-ask spread at midday.
Panel B of table 7 and figure 5 provIde evidence for Japanese stocks. Again, for these
stocks the bid-ask spread at midday is lower than for the matching American stocks. The results
early in the morning are similar to those shown in panel A, with a higher normalized spreadfor
the Japanese stocks than for their matching American stocks. Contraiy to the European stocks,
though, the bid-ask spread for Japanese stocks at the end of the day is not significantlylower
than at midday. There is no evidence that competition by foreign markets eliminates the higher
bid-ask spread in the morning. The absence of a higher bid-ask spread at the end of the day
cannot be attributed to competition since foreIgn markets are dosed at that time. Further, in our
sample, the behavior of the Japanese stocks at the end of the day is not differentfrom their
matching stocks.
It is difficult to believe that the greater normalized spread of foreign stocks early in the
morning reflects greater adverse selection resulting from a higher probability thatthe specialist
would end up trading with investors who have private information. This Is because, presumably,
19private information trading is more kely to take place onthe deeper home market of a security
and during the foreign business day. It may well be, though, that In the morning,as American
livestors react to overnight public information, there is a substantial riskfor the specialist of large
changes in his Inventory resulting from changes in the Americaninvestors' demand for foreign
securities. The specialist would protect himself from such changes by posting a greaterbid-ask
spread.
Section 6. ConcludIng remarks.
In this paper, we investigate the intraday volatility, volume, and bid-ask spread patterns
for stocks that differ markedly in the arrival rate of public information during the trading day. We
lInd that, in spite of the differences in the anival rate of public information, all groups of stocks
have U-shaped patterns of volume and volatility. The U-shaped patterns in volatility cannot be
explained by the conternporaneous arrival of public information for the different stocks. Models
with trading on private information do not seem to be consistent with our results. This is because,
for Japanese stocks, one would expect volatility to be less for the stocks listed in London than
for the other stocks if private information is a major determinant of volatility because investors with
private information presumably take advantage of the opportunity to trade in London. We find no
support for this.
A plausible story for our results is that investors in the U.S. trade on the basis of the
accumulated stock of public information since the last dosing of the U.S. markets. This stock of
liformation is the largest for Japanese stocks since a whole business day takes place between
the dose and open of U.S. markets, the second largest for European stocks since more than half
a business day takes place between the dose and open of U.S. markets, and smallest for
American stocks. With this view, investors trade on public information because it changes their
20priors. The process of demand revelation causes pices toexhibit greater volatility. Consequently,
the opening price is not a noisy estimate of the fundamentalsknown at the open; rather, the
demand by American investors Is revealed only over time as they react to theaccumulated public
information. The volatility of matching American stocks is lower in the momingbecause not much
has happened to change Investors' priors. Bid-ask spreads are larger inthe morning for foreign
stocks because there is more uncertainty about demand. The foreign Mocks also have a trading
concentration at the end of the day, but it is more likely due to random forces than toinvestors
reacting to public information, since little public information hasaccrued on these stocks during
the day. Hence, this concentration of trading does not lead to higher bid-ask spreads.VVhereas
one can understand the greater concentration of trading of foreignstocks early in the day, the
concentration of trading towards the end of the day is a puzzle left for future research.
The great similarity of the intra-day patterns across Europen, Japanese and American
stocks suggests that, once one compares stocks with similar volume and volatility, differencesin
the rate of arrival of public information during the day, as opposed to ovemight, arenot as
important as expected. This result can be interpreted as evidence that news duringthe U.S.
business day are sufficienily important for foreign stocks that they lead to intra-day patterns
similar to those of U.S. stocks of similar volume and volatility.
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23Table 1. Returns (86-87)
Intraday returns of domestic and foreign stocks trading in New 'York. The percentage return for each intervalis computed with
the bid-ask midpoints. The ratio, Morning/Afternoon', is computed excluding the opening return. The t-statisti arcobtained
using the Neviey and West (1987) method with 15 lags.
A. European vs. U.S.
Mean Returns (%) per Interval Morning /
Intraday Afternoon
________________________________________ Totalt8tat(=i)
(1) Domestic, 0.033 .0.006 0.000 0.010 0.002 .0.009 0.0520.0813 0.098
t-stat(=0) 1.409 -0.373 0.007 1.149 0.288 -1.048 4368 -1319
(2) European: 0.108 .0.068 0.015 0.004 0.005 0.010 0.0630.1366 -0.627
t-stat(=0) 3.609 -4.250 1.262 0.427 0.544 1357 5.969 4.189
(1)- (2): .0075 0.062 -0.015 0.005 .0.003 .0.019 -0.011.0.0553 0.725
t-stat(=0) .2377 4.413 .1343 0.602.0356 -1.983 .1.246 1.765
(=0)
B.Japanese vs. U.S.
Mean Returns C%) per kitaival Morrdng/
Intraday Afternoon
Totalt-stat (= 1)
(I) Domestic: 0-01! 0.018 0.009 0.004 0.010 0.002 0.045 0.0990 0347
(=0) 0.530 1.270 0.957 0342 1328 0.279 4.181 -1.151
(2) Japan(All): 0.156 0.022 -0.007 .0.009 0.006 0.005 0.079 0.2529 0.068
c-sLaI(=0) 2.114 1.076 .0.637 -1.437 0.876 0.616 5.787 -3.312
(1)- (2): -0.146 -0.004 0.016 0.013 0.004 -0.003 -0.035.0.1539 0.478
t-stal(=0) .1.951 -0.202 1.117 1390 0.491 O.2614.213 1.020
(=0)
C.J-LSE vs. J-non LSE
Mean Returns (%) per lntesval Morning /
Intraday Afternoon
____________________________________Totalt-stat(=1)
(t)Japan(NomL.SE): 0.183 0.019 .0.007 .0.016 0.002 -0.002 0.071 0.2503 .0.044
t.stat (=0) 2.327 0370 .0301 -2.046 0139 -0A72433 .2.395
(2) Japan (1_SE): 0.104 0.026 .0.008 0.002 0.012 0.015 0.091 0.2419 0.190
t-stat(=0) 1.283 1.071 -0362 &198 1350 1.898 6.641 .3343
(I)- (2): 0.079 -0.007 0.001 -0.018 -0.010 -0.017 .0.020 00084 .0.233
t-stat (=0) 1.352 .0.260 0.050 -1718 .0S47 .1.638 .1.445 -0.567
(=0)Table 2. Variance (66-87)
Intradayvariances of domestic and foreign stocks trading in Mew York. Using the bid-ask midpoints, the normalized variance for
each interval is computed as a fraction of the totalinndayvariance. The ratio, Morning/AfternoonS. is computed c,tcluding the





(I) Domestic 0.380 0.270 0.192 0.137 0.106 0.121 0.1730.00035 1.495
t.scat(=0) 5356 19.662 11.036 22.735 20.909 17.427 12.458 5.431
(2) European: 0.793 0.229 0.181 0.149 0.104 0.122 0.1540.00026 1.629
t-stat(=0) 7.605 21.92924345 17.798 14.031 10.993 14377 6325
(l)-(2) .0.412 -0.019 0.011 -0.013 0.002 .0.002 0.0190.00009 .0134
t.tat(0) .6.758 -1.149 0.603 -1315 0.292 .0124 -1.139
(=0)
B.Japanese vs. U.S.
Fractionof Intraday Total Morning I
IntradayAfternoon
___________________________________________Totalt-s*at(=I)
(I)Domestic 0A43 0.274 0.174 0_Iso 0.112 0.117 0.1730.00015 1.486
t.tat(0) 3.626 20.47920.152 23.883 22.97621460 13.199 5.374
(2) Japan (All): 5.638 0.403 0.143 0.106 0.084 0.098 0.1650.00008 1.878
(=0) 7301 10328 11.091 &915 10.783 10.699 11390 4.497
(1)-(2): .5195 .0.129 0.030 0.044 0.028 0.019 0.0080.00006.0392
I-stat (=0) -6.977 -3.251 1.877 3.423 3.111 1.864 .2.029
(=0)
C.J-LSE vs. J-non LSE
Fractionof Irtaday Total Morning I
IntradayAlternooa
Totalt-stat(1)
(I) Japan (Noo.LSE): 1466 0.408 0.130 0.105 0.078 0.104 0.1750.00009 1.798
t-stat(=0) &100 7.011 8392 6393 9.196 7.096 8.660 2.895
(2) Japan (I.SE): 5.914 0396 0.166 0.107 0.093 0.088 0.1510.00008 2.017
t-ssat(=0) 7358 13.341 11308 7.827 7S55 11.493 12.454 5.600
(1) -(2): 448 0012 -0.036 -0.002 -0.014 0.017 0.0240.00001 -8219
t-stat(=0) -0323 0.187 -1.929 -0.108 -1.114 0.992 -0.703
(=0)Table 3. cumulative variance (86-87): Excluding Open
Cumulativeintraday variances of domestic and foreign docks trading in New York. Usingthe bid-ask midpoints,
the cumulative variance for each interval Is computed as acumulative fraction of the total intradny variance exclud-
ing the opening variance. The t-statistia are computed usingthe Newey nod West (1987) method with 15 lagt
A.European vs. U.S.
CumulativeFraction of Intraday Total
_______________Total
(1) Domestic 0.270 0.462 0.599 0.706 0.821 1.0000.00035
i-stat (=0) 19.662 30.160 40.91853329 73.430 12.458
(2) European: 0.289 0.410 0.620 0324 0.846 1.0000.00026
ttat (=0) 2L929 29.936 43.068 56.44394.433 14.377
(1) -(2): -0.019 .0.008 -0020 -0.018 -0.019 0.00009
i-stat (=0) -1.149 -0.409 -1.141 .1.107 .1.929
B.Japanese vs. U.S.
CumulativeFraction of Intraday Total
______ Total
(1) Domestic 0.274 0.448 0398 0.110 0.821 1.0000.00015
I-stat (=0) 20.479 30.88940.843 51.723 70.605 13.199
(2) Japan(All): 0.403 0347 0.653 0.736 0.835 1.0000.00008
I-stat (=0) 10328 1833427484 38.94054.230 11390
-0.129 -0.099 -0.055 -01)26 .0.008 0.00006
i-stat(=0) -3251 -3.055 .2.247 -1.291 -0533
C.J-LSE vs. J-non LSE
CumulativeFraction of Intraday Total
(I) Japan (Non-LSE): 0.408 0338 0.643 0.721 0.825 1.0000.00009
i-stat(=0) 7011 11.747 18150 25201 39.762 8-660
(2)Japan (1_SE): 03% 0.562 0.669 0.761 0.849 1.0000.00008
I-Stat (O) 13341 24.83233308 42.07554570 12.454
(1) (2): 0.012 .0.024 -0.026 .0.040 -0.024 0.00001
t-stat(=0) 0.187 -0.479 -0.676 -1235 -1.088Table 4. Variance (86-87): Using TransactionPrices
Intraday variances ofdomesticandForeignstocts trading inNew York. Using thetransactiOn prices, panel A shows the norm-
.alized variance for each interval computed a Fraction ofthetotal intraday variance. Panel B shows the difference From the
results obtained using the bid.ask midpoints in Table 2. The ratio,MorningFAfttrnOOn',is wmputed excluding the opening
variance. The t.statistia are obtained tising the Newey and West (1987)method with 15 lags.
A-i. European vs U.S.
Fraction of Intraday Total Morning I
wasmtannm'uaiwtt? tT
(1) Domestic: 0.302 0.252 0.175 0.155 0.112 0.121 0.185 0.00045 1.396
t-stat(=O) 5.170 17.361 34312 9.142 25.942 20.997 11.901 4.444
(2)European: 0.601 0.299 0.185 0.138 0.107 0.116 0.1550.00036 1649
t-stat(=0) 8.435 9.571 11358 13.400 14.107 11.459 10.644 3.647
(1)• (2): .0.300 .0.047 .0.010 0.017 0.005 0.005 0.0300.00009 .0.253
(=0) .4.641 .1.968 -0.607 0.865 0.658 0.469 .1.727
(=0)
A-2. Japanese vs. U.S.
Fraction of Intraday Total Morning /
To ta)
(1) Domestic: 0377 0.247 0.151 0.149 0.108 0.115 0.2300.00023 1.206
t.scat(0) 4.256 9.233 12.649 13.871 11393 12.324 11.400 1.031
(2)Japan(MI): 4.172 0.401 0.144 0.105 0.083 0.097 0.1700.00021 1.857
t.stat(0) 8.303 7.654 8.647 8.337 9357 11.057 9.460 3.230
(1)- (2): .3794 .0.154 0.007 0.044 0.025 0.018 0.0600.00012 .0.650
I-stat(=0) .7j25 -3.824 0.364 2.480 2_292 1.823 .2.710
(=0)
A-3.J-LSE vs. J-non LSE
Fraction of Iritraday Total Morning /
Intraday Afternoon
_____ Totalt-.Iat (= 1)
(1)Japn(NOn-LSE) 4.076 0.381 0.127 0.112 0.088 0.107 0.1860.00022 1.628
s-stat (=0) 6.896 6.042 7.974 1362 7.688 9.448 8.358 2.245
(2)Japan(1.SE): 4.315 0.433 0.172 0.093 0.075 0.081 0.1460.00011 2313
Itat(O) 7.992 10.846 7.907 7.130 7.118 7.970 9.296 4.013
(1)-(2): -0.239 -0.053 .0.046 0.020 0.013 0.026 0.0400.00001 .0.684
tt2t(=0) .0.419 .1.607 -2.465 1495 0934 2.020 .2.437
(=0)Table 4. (Continued)
B-i. European vs U.S.
Fractionof Irtaday Total Morning I
IntradayAfternoon
Totali-stat (=0)
(1) Domestic 0.081 0.022 0.01$ .0.020 -0.005 0.000 -0.011.0.00009 0.098
t.stat(=0) 2.129 1.321 0.807 -1.058 U92 0.055 1.443
(2) Europearn 0.1874012 .0.004 0.013 -0.003 014)7 -0.001.0.00010 .0.019
ttat(=0) 3.533 -0356 -0.259 1.182 -0323 0.731 .0.111
B-2.Japanese vs. U.S.
Fractionof Intradsy Total Morning I
tntradayAfternoon
_____________________________TotalI-stat (0)
(1) Domestic 0.064 0.028 0.022 0.001 0.004 0.003 -0.058.0.00008 0.372
t-uat (=0) 0.784 0.982 1.901 0323 0.466 0299 3362
(2)Japan(M) 1.462 0.003aooi 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.005-0.00003 0013
t-stat (=0) 3.219 0.039 —0.066 0.086 0.084 0.159 0.040
B-3.J-LSE vs. J-non LSE
Fractionof Irttraday Total Morning I
______________________________________________________Intraday Afternoon
Totali-scat (=0)
(1) Japan (Non.LSE) 1.390 0.027 0.003 -0.001 -0.0090.002 -0.011-0.00003 0.170
t.stat(=0) 2.451 0.30t 0369 -0.418 -41671 4.158 0-426
(2) Japan (LSE): 1398 -0.037 -0.027 0.014 0.018 0.007 0.005 0.00003 .0.296
t-stat(=0) 3315 .0.925 -0367 L1fl 2.422 0.684 0.961Table 5. Normalized Volume (86-87)
intraday variation in volume of domestic and foreign stocks trading
in New York. The normalized volume for each interval is co
puted as the number ofsharestraded over the interval divided by the average of all intervals. The ratio, MorningfAIternoon,is
computed excluding the opening volume. The t4taliStiCS are
obtained using the Newey and West (1981) method with 15 lags.
A. European vs. U.S.
F radian of lntraday Total Morning I
(1)Domestic: 0.054 0.193 0.182 0.159 0.123 0.137 0.206607205 1.144
I-stat(=0) 38315 64.790 58119 67.055 54.802 62234 38357 7.962
(2) European: 0.063 0.238 0.193 0.145 0.101 0.123 0.200610.670 1.357
I-stat (=0) 20.928 49.166 46.231 41.828 37.490 31.740 27.695 8380
(1)- (2): .0.008 .0.046 .0.010 0.014 0.0fl 0.014 0.006 .3465 -0.213
t.stat(0) .3.141 -8.745 -2.2863.6 6.815 3354 .5.406
(=0)
B.Japanese vs. U.S.
Fraction of InHaday TotaJ Morning /
_________ To )
(1) Domestic 0.054 0.211 0.180 0.155 0.119 0.132 0.204608.658 1.201
I-stat (=0) 26.896 24.059 44.186 37.654 30398 29318 33.166 4.759
(2)Japan (All): 0.073 0.248 0.172 0.136 0.096 0.118 0.230608.125 1.251
t-stat (=0) 22.219 45.681 25.291 22.846 23333 24.416 20.443 6.546
(1). (2): .0.019 .0037 0.007 0.020 0.023 0.014 .0.027 0333 -0.049
t.aat(O) .4.866 .4.015 1.065 2.933 3.989 2.222. .0.886
(=0)
C. J-LSE vs. J-non LSE
Fraction of Intraday Total Morning /
Intraday Afternoon
_____ _____ ______ Totalt-ataI( I)
(1)Japan(Non.1.SE) 0.065 0.254 0.178 0.133 0.101 0.115 0.219 605.492 1.295
t.stat(0) 20.971 41389 20373 21327 22.015 24.440 17245 5.941
(2) Japan (LSE) 0.085 0.240 0.165 0.140 0.088 0.121 0.246604.857 1.196
tlat(O) 10.970 22.795 20.016 13.921 24.321 12.290 17.714 3.696
(1)- (2): .0.020 0.014 0.013 .0.007 0.013 .0.005 -0.027 0.635 0.100
14181 (=0) .W7 1.121 1.244 .0.639 1.904 .0.499 1.465
(=0)Table 6. cumulative Normalized Volume (86-87):Excluding Open
Intraday
variation in cumulative volume of domestic and foreign stocks trading InNew York. The cumulative
volume for each Interval is computed a cumulative fractionof the latzaday total volume e,ccluding the open-
in volume. The t.usti are obtained tLsingthe Newny and West (1987) method Mth 15 lags.
A.European vs. U.S.
CumulativeFraction of Intraday Total—ty
(I) Domestic 0.193 0375 0.534 0.651 0.794 1.000607.205
i-stat (=0) 64.790 85.969135.419142.072192.555 38.357
(2) European: 0.238 0.431 0376 0.677 0200 1.000610.670
i-stat (=0) 49.166 69.325 76.842106364173.495 21.695
.0.046 -0.056 .0.042 .0.020 .0.006 -3.465
t.stat(=O) .8.745 .8.116 .5859 .3.086 .1.394
B.Japanese vs. U.S.
CumulativeFraction of Intraday Total—
(1)Domestic 0.211 0.390 0346 0.665 0.796 1.000608.658
t.stat (=0) 24.05943385 62.494 77.401107.067 33.766
(2)Japan(All): 0.248 0.420 0356 0.652 0.770 1.000608.125
c.stat(=O) 45.681 60.153 73.487 85291 101.193 20.443
(1).(2): .0.037 .0.030 .0.010 0.013 0.077 0333
t.stat (=0) .4.015 .2.649 .0.884 i.fl9 2.919
C.J-LSE vs. J-non LSE
CumulativeFraction of Iniraday Total
_________________________________Intraday
Total$:']
(I) Japan (Non.LSE): 0.254 0.431 0364 0.666 0.781 1.000605.492
i-stat (=0) 41389 49.692 59.807 78.10291349 17.245
(2) Japan (iSE): 0.240 0.405 0345 0.633 0.754 1.000604257
1413!(=0) 22.795 32.783 4939355336 63.007 17.714
(1)- (2): 0.014 0.027 0.020 0.033 0.077 0.635
t.stat(=0) 1.121 1346 1.457 2.662 2.067Table 7. Bid AskSpreadRelative to Midday (86-87)
Intraday patterns in bid-ask spreads of domestic and foreign stocks tradingin Mew York. The bid-ask spread for each
interval is measured as a percent of the bid-asic midpoint at the end of each interval,and reported below as a fraction
of the bid-ask spread for the third trading interval (11:40 - 12.45). The t-statistia areobtained using the Newey and
West (1987) method with 15 lagi.
percent oF price A. European vs. U.S.
(1)Domestic: 1.117 1.035 1.008 1 0.998 0S91 1.008 1.022
t.stat(=1) 23.705 10.082 2.300 -0.726 -1.046 1.286 37.370
(2) European: 1.172 1.040 1.015 1 0.989 0.999 0.974 0.890
t-atat(=1) 23.734 6357 2326 -2.026 -0j51 -4.803 37.398
4.055 -0.004 -0.008 0 0.009 -0.002 0.035 0.131
t.tat(0) -5542 -0394 -L134 1348 -0308 5.110
percent of price B. Japanese vs. U.S.
(I)Dornestic 1.097 1.026 0597 1 0591 0.991 0.997 0.914
t-stat (=1) 17.760 5.204 -0.837 .2.344 -1.902 -0309 36.691
(2) Japan (All): 1.241 1.056 1.003 1 0.991 0.974 0992 04%
t-stat (1) 9.420 4.666 0.274 -1.047 -t1194.839 45.003
-0.144 .0.031 -0.006 0 0.001 0.011 0.005 0.424
r-stat(=0) -5.601 -2339 -0351 0.078 1.682 0398
percentof price C. J-LSE vs. J-non LSE
(1) Japan (Non-LSE):t5 1.045 0.993 1 0987 0.976 0589 0.483
ttat (=1) 7324 2.658-OAfl -1.068 -2106 -0.791 43.903
(2) Japan (L.SE): 1147 1.072 1.019 1 0597 0972 0.997 0301
t-aat(=1) 7.694 4207 1.076 4.204 -1340 -0.145 34.907
-0.012 -0.027 .0.026 0 -0.010 0.005 -0.009 -0.018
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Intwnl End Wi9 Atappendix. sample of tor.iqnStock. and American Matching stocks
Foreach foreign stock in the sampleanditsthree Airerican matching stock.. thistable
provides the ticket .ymbol.the firm name, the CUSIP mutter,the number of trading days for
the year, the average numberof trades per day, the standarddeviation of hourly return., the
firm sizeinunit of $1,000 (the average price
for the year time, the riunber of shares
0tstanding at the beginning of the year),
the exchange where the stock is listsat the end
of the year IN denote. NYSE and Adenotes?MEX), and the lowest price for the year.
Al.European stocks Listed inNyn/NWX in 1906
5Th.tWit CUSIP DAYS NIPOStd0ev. SIZEPEX L.0WPRI
1 ASA AS?.LTD
00205010 23692.14 0.005563 341651 1426.8
2AIlS PJJSIMOKTcOSIPO N V 0521151023621.660.008601 561360 N 12.3
3OP BRITISH PETELTD 11006940 23630.150.00361261021341 N 30.1
4 BTI BAT 19409 P L C 0552702023653.550.006001 0701392 A 4.2
S STYBRITISH TELEcOIISP 1.C 1110213023313.130.004164 119511440 N24.6
6 £71 ETZ LAWD LTD
29780210236 6.670.011495 20611 A 8.4
7 IttIMPERIALDIEM11405 PLC 4527045023656.670.003337 0041172 N 42.1
B KIllKIll ROYAL WICK AIRLS 4625161023616.320.005569 799215 1417.5
9 LASLASER19405 LTD 51006110 23630.850.012002 49016 A 9.0
10NHY NORSKIIYDROA.S 65653160 11015.600.001912 1733943 N16.9
11 NYC N0INOUSTRI P. S 6101002023649.690.006109 767331 N25.9
12 RD ROYALCUTO4 PETE CO 10025760236 139.780.003106213521529159.8
13 Sc SHELL TRAIlS ITRADINGLTD 0221055023639.330.00352713319805N36.0
4Un UNILEVERNV 9047815023635.390.003406 6018403 14131.
mericanMatching stocks in 1986
1 CLX CLOROXCO 1890541023683.200.005585 1357360 N44.0
1HPC HERCULESINC 42705610 23692.020.005510 2601133 N 31.0
1 NES NEW ENGLASIDCISC SYS 64400110 23617.100.005540 197415 N24.4
2 A1.4ALLEN GROUP INC 01763410 23623.010.006507 152105 N14.0
2 £12 ELECTROSPACESYS INC 2061621023617.700.008630 215164 N 13.6
2 N6I NBI INC
62613510236 25.090.008503 107140 N 7.5
3 lOP IalA REt INC 4625311023632.04 0.004157 315430 1422.0
3 INC IOWAILLGAS IELECCO 4624701023625.910.004176 528383 N34.5
3 NFL WISCONSIN PWR £LTCo 9169261023632.210.003931 660131 N39.0
4 HF!HUDSON FOODS INC 4437621021143.140.009961 198196 A10.8
I MAX MATRIX CORPN3 5768291023653.61 0.009586 214216 A 14.3
4 OZAOZARK HLOGSINC 69263210 10219.64 0.006308 192495 A 11.6
5 S BASIDAG INC
0590151023615.310.004221 641599 N 51.0
5 CYLcYCLOPSCORP 2325251023611.300.004165 252001 N51.4
5 WIC WWORINC 9292531023611.170.004283 219106 N29.4
6 lOINHN4DY7WI CORP 41033510 233 6.31 0.011701 07494 A 26.5
6 3CC JAtO8SENGR GROUPINC 16901410236 6.010.011409 37591 A 6.3
6 TDXTRIDEX CORP 895906102366.910.011295 14240 A6.5
1SF9SOUTHWESTERN PUB SVC CO 6457131023665.210.0039161266101 N25.3
7tE TECO ENERGY INC 8723751023661.510.003691 1210581 1434.0
7WPCWIScONSINUSC FlIP CO 9766561023660.140.003569 1724923 N38.4
6 Cli)EASTERN GAS IFUEL?.SSOC 21646110 23646.790.005555 611956 N 22.3
6 IR INGERSOLL RANDCO 15666610 23639.14 0.005411 1182693 N50.9
• SUiSEA LD CORP 61140110 18137.810.005460 511001 N19.6
9 6004 GREENI4AJIBROS INC 39537010 236 34.690.011844 09292 A 6.4
9 MIlKHERITAGE CNTMTINC 4272211017929.800.012112 21569 A 6.6
9 NIlNEWIARX I LEWISINC 6515161023631.490.012223 54844 A 10.8
10 COP E0 IND
15003610 22514.14 0.001625 111764 N26.5
10 CSt1CINCINNATI OELLINC 1716701023616.780.0O485 415561 N36.3
10 IA LACLEDEGASCO 5055881023613.280.004635 302117 N29.0
11 MRBBLOCKH £ ftINC 09367110 23652.11 0.006308 511600 N35.6
11 KSF QUAKERSTOIL REENG CORP 1414191023611.14 0.006368 664398 N23.0
11 RADRITE AID CORP 1677541023658.800.006461 124572' N24.3
12 AlT?JIERICNIINFO TECHS CORP 02680110236 136.91o.oo115912365371 N98.0
12 ED CONSOLIDATEDEDISONCO N Y I 20911110236 124.630.003929 5627416 N31.6
12 SBCSOUTHWESTERN SELLCORP 64533310236 154.61 0.003525 9946680 N19.0
13 011CENTEL CORP 1513341023641.61 0.00106' 1521205 N45.0
13LOULOUISVILLE GAS I ELECCO 5166761023613.510.003772 710030 N29.0
13 MOP. MARCO INC 56509710236 36.090.004131 1432451 N36.0
14 AD MISTEDINDSINC 03211710 10240.600.002167 502821 N41.3
14 ORUOflNGE IROCIQ.AND UTILEINC6610651023631.620.004145 416818 N26.3
14 SWX SOUTHWEST GAS CORP 8446951023631.960.004571 203265 N 16.6ropean Stocks Listedin NYSE/N4EX in 1907
0855Th NAME CUSIP DAYSNTPDStd0ev. SIZEPEX LCWPRI
1MA MA LTD 00205010219 154.620.010600 535916 N20.0
2 ALPSAUSIMCNTcaiPON V 05211510 21920.360.011999 556687 N10.0
3 BPSBRITISH flITS PLC 11041920 19210.390.009332 1631031 N 16.1
4 8N1CO CENTRALSA 05947020219 8.560.006319 1616071 N16.5
5 Bp BRITISHPETE LTD 1108894021911.660.001,5728168704 N43.3
6 BTIB A T INDS P L C 0552702021931.500.00911712731035 A 6.7
7BTYBRITISH TELEW P I. C 1110211021918.740.0046172545084$ N31.5
8 CLX GLAXONLDGS PLC 31132730115 298.97 0.0109451251736 N 1.9
9HANHANSONTRPLC 41135230219 118.060.009615 6860159 N 5.3
10 HRK HARDROCK CAFEPLC 1116321011623.870.013195 110923 A 5.1
11 ICIIMPERIAL 0104 INDS PLC 4527045021966.110.00534313866652 N62.6
12 1(124 1(124 ROYALDUTCH MRLS 48251610 21946.310.009301 1013989 N13.3
13 LASLASER tWOSLTD 5180611021922.660.017963 49351 A 4.6
14 NHYNORSK HYDRO A S 6565316021922.700.007587 2400634 N19.5
15 NVONOVO INCUSTRIA S 6701002021937.940.009121 1215200 N 11.3
16 NW NATL WEStMINSTERBKPLC 6385394021916.470.005217 1526411 N 24.0
17 9)40PHILIPS N V 11833750 15112.660.001944 5453637 N 14.3
16 RD ROYALDUTCHPETE CO 78025160219 153.580.00703431114320 N94.4
19 SC SHELL TMJ4S & TRADINGLTD 82210350 Ut 36.990.00540621249600 N 58.1
20 TEF CUIPANIATELEFONICA NAtIONAL2039021011379.820.014621 6601878 N 16.0
21 UN UNILEVER H V 9047845021966.700.006492 5053540 N 36.0
American)CatthinqStocksin1987
1 8EVBEVERLY ENTERPRISES ó8765110219 132.160.010520 876562 N 6.6
1 NSC NORFOLK SCUTHIt CORP 65564410219 162.720.010603 2812808 N 21.0
1 P11.PENNZOIL CO 70990310219 168.11 0.010613 3104101 N36.5
2 GOTGOTTSCHASKS INC 36348510 21921.690.011927 66086 N 7.4
2 RGCREPUBLICGYPSWS CO 76047310 21916.710.011975 66392 N 4.6
2 UTRUNITRODECORP 9132631021919.340.011929 163223 H 5.8
3 ENH ENHAR? CORPVA 29121010219 37.100.009455 1072660 N 16.0
3 IOU)4ARfl4MX CORP 41711910 21938.11 0.009327 565145 N16.3
3 KSIJKANSAS CITYSCUTHN INDS INC48517010 21935.660.009275 551515 N35.0
4 PtAFLORIDAEASTCOAST INDS 34063210219 6.760.006119 488169 N 39.5
I HNH MANNANA CO 41052210219 9.580.008524 242836 N17.0
4 Nfl IIISHEAR INDSINC 42839910 211 7.810.006436 111761 N12.3
5 FPCFLORIDA PROGRESS CORP 34110910 21961.84 0.005024 1130070 N 29.1
S PGYGLOBAL YIELDFUNDINC 379361.1021971.620.004993 550953 N 8.8
5 300SAil DIEGOGAS & ELECCO 7914401021979.840.001341 1879778 N28.3
6 DPCDATAPRODUCTS CORP 2381011021931.650.010856 238543 A6.9
6 PtAFIRSTFE0 AMERICA INC 3379051021921.260.010691 48942 A8.8
6 901 PLY0614 tWOS INC 7294161021929.260.010525 114196 A 9.0
71PMINTERSTATE PWR CO 16107410 21918.060.001662 225119 N19.4
7 IWO IOWAILL GAS £ELEC CO 4624701021920.070.004135 519974 N31.5
7 911CRWHITTAXER CORP 9666801021916.080.004385 269918 N22.1
8 OIACHAJ4PIONINTL CORP 15652510219 251.84 0.011147 3428698 N 23.3
6 CRRCONSOLIDATEDRAILCORP 20986410163 258.460.011211 2160351 N19.9
8 101 K MARTCORP 48258410219 321.970.011188 5117130 N21.6
9 CCCCOOIERCIALCR CO 20161510 219 100.430.009460 1223291 N17.0
9FDSFEDERATEDDEPT STORES INC 31409910219 129.510.009456 2672412 N28.4
9 LILLONG ISLAND LTG CO 51267110 21994.820.009464 1085744 N 6.1
10 RDGRANSBURG CORP 7532281021922.320.012838 93529 A 6.4
10SCFSCANDANAVIA ItINC 80600310 21919.560.014016 56444 A 5.8
10WJRCYPRESS ID INC 23276710 21921.280.013151 70340 A 5.6
11 DI?CENTELCORP 15133410 21953.990.005091 1616308 N32.8
11 TEPTUCSONELEC PWR CC 8986131021960.470.005211 1381461 N 49.3
11 liMPWSHINGTfl4WTR ncR CO 9406881021956.420.005298 589660 N22.3
12AVT AWE? INC 0538071021948.840.009386 1109091 N 16.5
12 CM CARESSA GRWP INC 19039410 21954.660.009213 75927 N 12.6
12 IC!JOHNSONCTLS INC 4783661021954.560.009431 607842 N20.5
13 CR11CROS*4 CRAFTS INC 2203091021922.230.017845 23572 A 10.9
13NM NENMARK £1.61118IHC 6515761021922.580.018443 64452 A3.5
13 SPYSWIFT ENERGY CO 8707381021924.980.018494 13912 A4.1
14aTER T 2 CORP 7497381021923.190.001611 233023 N 17.1
11 RYK RYKOFF SEXTON00 18375910 21922.31 0.007680 177726 N11.4
14 UGIUGI CORP 9026861021926.150.001552 256967 N21.8
15 SKYSKYLINECORP 8308301021943.680.008924 171360 N11.1
15 TIN TEMPLEINLANDINC 8798681021944.460.009471 1142009 N35.0
15 TUBTHGIAS &BET?! CORP 8843151021933.500.009582 823615 N41.5
16 fl4OFEDERAL MOGUL CORP 3135491021913.81 0.005302 509553 N29.1
II16 RTCROCHESTERTELCORP 7117581021919.170.005162 40986 N31.0
16SW STONE & WEOSTER INC 8615721021914.070.005093 485467 N48.8
17 HP HELMERICI4 PAYNE INC 4234521021941.220.008154 650231 N 17.5
17KLTKN4SASCITY P1411 & LT CO 48513410 21910.510.008135 641510 N21.0
17 NOBNORWESTCORP 66936010 21949.050.008118 1217901 N 31.8
18 .i.RALSTON PURINA CO 75127710219 150.400.006680 5861946 N 51.6
18 IJTPUTPJIP1411 £LTCO 91750810219 170.090.006749 1491052 N 20.8
18 1 WOOLWORTHF N CO 98088110219 155.810.007213 2963948 N 29.5
19 P04 WIllPOWERINCNEW 5641821014336.430.005610 799838 N42.1
19 NPH NORTH NIERN PHILIPS CORP 65704510 17532.340.005071 1280759 N 31.3
19 KG!.WASHINGTON GAS LT CO 93883110 21929.610.005460 408904 N19.5
20 KB KAUfl4AN I8RORD INC 48617010219 19.460.014393 347061 N 9.0
20SGLSUPERMARKETSGENCORP 8684431016276.010.014455 1490665 N 25.1
20 TN TRANSWORLDCORP 8731161021865.090.015628 602520 N 9.3
21 DCLBAUSCHI 1.fllB INC 0717071021974.37 0.008325 1276297 N 30.8
21 RORRORER GROJP INC 77675510219 70.680.008308 995740 N29.8
21 TMCTIMES MIRROR CO 8873601021978.42 0.008437 5286628 N 60.4
El. Japanses Stocks Listed in NYSE/AMEXin 1986
083 5Th KnIt C*JSIP DAYSNTPOStdDry. SIZE PEX LOWPRI
1 8411 "HITACHI LTD 13357850 23628.540.003292 156296944 N35.5
2 104CHONDA Nfl LTD 13612830 23644.360.00362962319856 N55.0
3 taO "1CfOCERALTD 50155620 2369.530.003609 1312510 14 39.6
4 MC MATSUSHITA ELEC INN. LTD 57687920 23633.510.003424 159661536 N60.0
5 SNESONY CORP 83569930 23652.370.004886 4769083 N 18.1
These stock. arealsolisted in London in 1986.
American Matching Stock, in 1986
1IORIOWARESINC 4625371023632.040.00415' 345430 N22.0
1IPIiINTERSTATE PWR CO 4610711023623.750.003968 233903 N21.1
1 WPL WISCONSIN P1411 & LICO 9768261023632.210,003831 660131 N39.0
2 CNTCENTELCORP 1513311023641.610.004067 1524205 N 45.0
2 LOULOUISVILLEGAS & ELECCO 5466761023643.51 0.003772 110030 N29.0
2 SNGSOUtHERNNEW ENGLAND TEL.CC 8434851023649.610.004073 1588952 8443.0
3 CEO GUILFORD 841.5INC 40179410236 8.320.004040 224672 N22.5
3 Nfl NEW JERSEY RES CORP 64602510236 9.580.003961 102292 N25.8
3 NflWEST INC 95334810236 7.900.003622 231840 N24.9
4 NOR 14APCO INC 5650971023638.090.004131 1432451 N36.0
4ORUOIWIGE IROCKLNID UTILSINC68406510 23631.620.004445 116818 N26.3
458CCSOUTHWEST GAS CORP 8448951023634.980.004511 203265 N16.6
5 CCBCAPITA].CITIESCG*IUNICATIOPI 13985910 23658.730.004953 3199108 N 208.2
5 IDA IDAHO91411 CO 45138010 23658.370.004713 891796 N22.8
5 TEK TEKTRONIX INC 87913110 23618.500.005020 1180811 N54.5
fl JapansesStocks Listed inNY5EIAXEXin 1987
085Sm NNIE cUSIP DAYSNTPDStd0ev. SIZE PEXLOWPRI
1 NIT "HITACHILTD 43357850 21932.000.00517022290416 N59.3
2POICHONDA HTR LTD 4381283021933.140.005058 8759186 N78.0
3iao "KYOCERALTD 5015562021910.960.006708 5248604 N48.0
4MC MATSUSHITA ELEC INOL LTD 5768792021919.890.00721324546272 N93.3
5 SHESONY CORP 8356993021942.010.006136 6236788 N18.3
"Thesestocks are also listed in London in 1987.
American Matching Stocks in 1987
1NPH NORTH AIIERN PHILIPS CORP 6570451017532.340.005071 1280759 N 37.3
1ORU ORANGE & ROCKLAND13111.5 INC6840451021927.480.005185 389911 N25.0
1 WOLWASHINGTON GAS LTCC 9388371021929.610.005460 408904 N 19.5
2NORKAPCO INC 5650971021932.280.004814 1197917 N39.9
2 SNGSOUTHERN NEW ENGLANDTELCO 8134851021934.870.004862 1590016 N43.0
2SRPSIERRA PAC RU 8264251021939.100.004994 467008 N16.0
3PTA PLAYBOY ENTERPRISESINC 7281111021911.920.006801 115986 N 6.4
3 PREPREMIER INN. CORP 7105121021911.170.006625 1114636 N28.9
3 SGO SEAGULLENERGY CORP 81200710219 9.760.006634 120291 N12.1
4 HTNHOUGHTG(MIFVLIN CO 44156010219 22.700.001212 457038 N20.8
I NflNEW.JERSEY RUCORP 6460251021921.940.007241 19316 N 16.1
III4 PHIl P14WGROUP INC 69332010 21921.160.007256 528549 N25.2
S PINPUBLICSYCco IND INC 7444651021919.550.006166 828360 N11.3
5 RCIRCICHHOLDOIDIS INC 75920010 14535.400.006136 357119 N32.8
S S SCPNA CORP 8058981021944.37 0.006260 1313997 N 26.5
iv